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-T.S. Eliot, "The Hollow Men"
I. INTRODUCTION
The University of Florida and its law review should be commended for
choosing Owen Jones for this year's Dunwody Lecture. Professor Jones
is still a young man, and as he acknowledges, he is by no means the first
to write about the important connections between law and biology.
Nevertheless, he should properly be regarded as a founding father of law
and biology in the same way that Judge Richard Posner is often regarded
as a founding father of law and economics. Both are enormously energetic
and productive in their efforts to bring together two disciplines. Both have
played critical roles in forming organizations where similarly interested
individuals can share ideas and challenge one another.' Perhaps most
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. Special thanks to Oliver Goodenough, David
Gordon, Margaret Gruter, Owen Jones, and Todd Zywicki for helpful comments, support, and
encouragement. I am also grateful to the Dean's Fund at Vanderbilt Law School for financial
support.
I. Professor Jones is a founder of the Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law and has
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importantly, both nurture newcomers with an admirable willingness to set
aside their own work to assist others, cheerfully and patiently, in their
efforts to grasp the tools of another discipline and advance the ball of
understanding. The field of law and biology is growing rapidly, and the
good scholarship typically has much to do with Owen Jones. His Article
in this volume exemplifies the sophisticated and careful nature of his work.
The general message that Professor Jones disseminates in his articles
is important.2 Law cannot reach peak effectiveness unless it is built on a
sound behavioral model, and no model of human nature is ultimately
sound unless it is consistent with the insights from behavioral biology
And the beauty of behavioral biology, for one who uses behavioral
models, is that it tells us something about human tastes, preferences, and
cognitive biases and limitations.
For example, economic models assume a utility function for
individuals which specifies individual tastes for goods and/or aversion to
bads. Individuals' preferences are ranked in some assumed way, and then
the model is used to predict how people will react to changes in their
environments. How will recycling behaviors change if the city provides
blue boxes in which to place the items at the curb? How will they change
if instead consumers must pay a refundable deposit when they purchase
goods in recyclable containers? What if the city gives a trophy to the
citizen who recycles the most in a given year? What if the mayor just
makes a speech at a public event asking the residents to bring their items
to a recycling center to help cut down on the costs of trash collection?
What if the residents' taxes are raised to take account of the costs of not
recycling? What if each household is charged on a per bin basis for non-
recycled trash collection? What ifnon-recyclers' addresses are listed in the
newspaper each week? And, if each of these alternatives can be predicted
to have some positive effect on recycling behavior, which will be most
effective at improving the situation, and which can stimulate a given
amount of recycling at the cheapest cost?
served as the group's President since its inception. He also maintains a website for the organization
that includes an impressive list of research materials for interested scholars.
http://www.sealsite.org/.
2. Margaret Gruter, Executive Director of the Gruter Institute for Law and Behavioral
Research, has also based her life's work on promoting the understanding of this message within
law. http://www.gruterinstitute.org/.
3. See, e.g., Owen D. Jones, Sex, Culture andthe Biology ofRape: Toward Explanation and
Prevention, 87 CAL. L. REV. 827, 833 (1999) [hereinafter Jones, The Biology of Rape]; Owen D.
Jones, On the Nature ofNorms: Biology, Morality, and the Disruption of Order, 98 MICH. L. REV.
2072,2073-74 (2000) [hereinafter Jones, On the Nature ofNorms] (reviewing FRANCIS FUKUYAMA,
THE GREAT DISRUPTION: HUMAN NATURE AND THE RECONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL ORDER (1999));
Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law's Leverage: Behavioral Economics
Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 NW. U.L. REV. 1141 (2001) [hereinafter Jones, Time-Shifted
Rationality].
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We cannot answer these questions very well unless we have a richer
understanding of what people care about and how they will respond to
different threats and rewards. In economics, if we assume that people will
always maximize wealth, without regard to other, nonmonetary "goods"
or "bads," we obtain naYve, often counterintuitive results. If instead we
assume that people maximize utility, we have begged an essential
question: what do people care about, and how do they rank their
preferences?'
Behavioral biology can help us understand what people will care about
and how they will evaluate the tradeoffs. If the "price" of recycling goes
down, people may demand more of it. But why? Is it reasonable to assume
that people will care about conservation in the first place?5 Is there
anything that we can do to make them care? And, is there any reason to
believe that a five-cent deposit will be more or less effective than
publishing the names ofnon-recyclers? In short, economic models become
more useful to policymakers if we can get into the black box of the
individual utility function and move beyond the assumption that people
have whatever tastes work most conveniently for the model.6 If we can
theoretically discern not only whether people will value A and B but also
how A will likely be valued relative to B, then the practical value of
predictive models will be significantly enhanced. And, as always, margins
matter.
II. MARGINS MATTER
With an eye for analytical symmetry, Professor Jones has quickly
recognized that law and biology can be improved by more sophisticated
models of the effects of biology on behavior. Economics, defined as "the
allocation of scarce resources among competing ends,"7 aids biology as
4. In general, economists have been unwilling to explore individual tastes and preferences.
Jack Hirshleifer, Economics From a Biological Viewpoint, 20 J.L. & ECON. 1, 17 (1977) ("Modern
neoclassical economics has forsworn any attempt to study the source and content of preferences,
that is, the goals that motivate men's actions. It has regarded itself as the logic of choice under
conditions of 'given tastes."').
5. Consumers apparently do care about conserving their environments. See Peter S. Menell,
Symposium, Environmental Federalism: Structuring aMarket-OrientedFederalEco-Information
Policy, 54 MD. L. REv. 1435, 1435 (1995) (citing a Gallop Poll that found more than 90% of
consumers polled look for environmentally safe products and are willing to pay more for them).
6. To my knowledge, the first person to make this observation was Jack Hirschleifer.
Hirshleifer, supra note 4, at 17-26 (discussing biology's important advances in identifying
scientifically analyzable human tastes and preferences).
7. WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIoNs
5 (3d ed. 1985). Nicholson continues:
This definition stresses two important features of any economy that will concern
us throughout this book. First, productive resources are scarce-they do not exist
2001]
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much as biology furthers economics. And, nowhere is Jones's recognition
of this fact more evident than in this Article
To be sure, Professor Jones has always emphasized the importance of
analytic clarity. He consistently reminds us that the nature/nurture
dichotomy is a false one.9 He warns us to beware of the Naturalistic
Fallacy," but not to land in the Moralistic Fallacy." Correlation does not
equal causation,'2 and causal influences by themselves do not imply that
behavior is deterministic. 3 It is difficult to steer clear of these errors, but
Jones nevertheless navigates flawlessly through the topics he addresses.
in sufficient amounts to satisfy all human wants. This scarcity imposes a variety
of constraints both on the choices available to a society and on the opportunities
open to its members: No society can produce all the economic goods desired by
all its members; no individual can spend more than his or her income; no one can
use more than 24 hours in one day. Rather, choices must be made about how
resources will be used, and that necessity leads to the second feature of the
definition of economics: the concern with discovering how choices are made
among competing ends. By examining the activities of consumers, producers,
suppliers of resources, governments, and voters and by focusing on interactions
among these agents, economists seek to understand how resources are allocated.
Id.; see also GARY S. BECKER, ECONOIC THEORY 1 (1971) ("[E]conomics is the study of the
allocation of scarce means to satisfy competing ends .... The ends must be competing in order that
value judgments or choices of different kinds are involved. When there are no alternatives, there
is no problem of choice and, therefore, no economic problem.").
8. Owen D. Jones, Proprioception, Non-Law and Biolegal History, 53 FLA. L. REV. 831
(2001).
9. See, e.g., Jones, The Biology ofRape, supra note 3, at 874-77 (describing nature/nurture
and related proximate/ultimate concepts as complementary rather than dichotomous); Jones, Time-
ShiftedRationality, supra note 3 ("[N]ature and nurture are inseparably intertwined, neither making
sense without the other. All biological processes, including normal brain development, ultimately
depend upon rich environmental inputs. Similarly, all environmental influences can only be
perceived, sorted, mentally analyzed and understood through biological-and therefore
evolutionary-processes.").
10. Jones, The Biology of Rape, supra note 3, at 894. The Naturalistic Fallacy assumes that
what is necessarily should be.
11. Id. at 894-95 ("The Moralistic Fallacy, in mirror image, is committed whenever one
assumes that 'is' follows from 'ought,' such that what ought to be is what is.") (citing Charles
Crawford, The Theory of Evolution in the Study of Human Behaviour: An Introduction and
Overview, in HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY: IDEAS, ISSUES AND APPLICATIONS 9
(Charles Crawford & DennisL. Krebs eds., 1998) and Charles Crawford, Genetic, Ethological, and
Evolutionary Perspectives on Human Development, 20 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAv. 138, 139
(1999)).
12. Id. at 882.
13. Ia. at 878 ("Evolved predispositions operate probabilistically and are observable in
species-typical, environment-sensitive patterns. Because probability is not inevitability,
predispositions simply do not guarantee any behavior from any individual. And even high
probabilities about patterns likely to emerge from some small subset of a population tell us little
reliable about how a single individual is likely to behave."); Jones, Time-ShifedRationality, supra
note 3.
[Vol. 53
HeinOnline  -- 53 Fla. L. Rev. 908 2001
DUNWODY COMMENTARY
More recently, however, he has begun to incorporate the concept of
elasticities into his analysis. In an earlier article, Professor Jones
introduced the profound yet elegantly simple notion of "the law of law's
leverage."' 4 As illustrated in Figure 2 of his Article, 5 law is a tool that we
use to change human behavior, and its ability to work as a lever to
influence that behavior turns on the degree to which that behavior was
adaptive for humans in the environment of evolutionary adaptation (EEA).
Marital infidelity will be more difficult to influence than will SEC filings,
for example. In this Article, Professor Jones works more explicitly with
slopes and elasticities, acknowledging that the fulcrum notion is useful but
a bit simplistic. In other words, law's leverage on a given behavior,
adaptive or not, will also depend upon the external environment and the
individual's immediate goals and alternatives. Not fully comfortable with
burdening the reader with formal mathematics, however, Professor Jones
sticks with his diagrams, asking the reader to envision human behavior in
differing shapes and the environmental landscape with variable contours.
Professor Jones also appears to be developing an instinctive, perhaps
proprioceptive awareness that any influence on human behavior is likely
mediated by a countervailing one, so that extreme or exact predictions
about human behavior are typically flawed in some way. From the
perspective of the biologist, a blending of these opposing influences is
typically more adaptive than the existence of either alone. Take, for
example, the human emotional predispositions toward revenge and
forgiveness. If one seeks revenge when wronged, one discourages
predation by others. On the other hand, if one is predisposed to forgive
others, then that person can avoid the costs of vengeful behavior, which
can divert valuable resources away from more productive pursuits. Too
often, scholars focus on one or the other countervailing influence,
forgetting that evolutionary forces would favor some blending of the two
behavioral traits. This recognition, that "optimality" typically requires a
compromise among competing resources, is the hallmark of a good
economist. In their, jargon there is always a tradeoff, making corner
solutions rare.
Other potentially countervailing influences exist in evolutionary theory.
Natural selection favors behavior that contributes directly to the survival
of the individual and close kin (so that the genes can be passed on). But
sexual selection favors behavior that attracts a mate, which can often mean
signaling an excess of survival resources. One does this by behaving in
ways that threaten survival; conspicuous consumption requires throwing
away resources, and the peacock's tail makes escape from predators more
difficult. Of course, the ideal strategy is to blend the two together, where,
14. Jones, On the Nature of Norms, supra note 3, at 2100.
15. Jones, Proprioception, Non-Law and Biolegal History, supra note 8, at 842.
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for example, the conspicuous consumption takes a form that actually does
contribute to survival, and we may be able to predict that this behavior will
generate the greatest evolutionary success.
If we take into account that both natural and sexual selection are at
work, that both biological and environmental influences affect behavior,
and that both selfish and other-regarding behaviors can be adaptive, it
becomes difficult, in many circumstances, to predict precisely with
biology how humans will behave. More importantly, it becomes even more
difficult to use biology to predict precisely how humans will respond at the
margin to legal efforts to channel their behaviors. Yes, the law of law's
leverage predicts that the responsiveness of behavior to law will tend to
correlate negatively with the adaptiveness of that behavior in the EEA. But
even with the law of law's leverage, we have difficulty predicting how
behavior A will be affected by legal reform R in society S at time T, which
is precisely the problem that the policymaker must attempt to resolve.
We cannot solve this problem until we know more about the other ways
in which behavior A is influenced. How does the society respond to
behavior A? Does society respond with shunning and ostracism, with spite
and revenge, or with back slapping and congratulations? Is behavior A
subject to attempts to educate? Are there other legal methods already in
place that affect behavior A? With parental education, strong social norms,
and alternative or complementary legal tools, very little law maybe needed
to change behavior. Alternatively, education, norms and other law already
may have changed the behavior of those who were most easily influenced,
so that those otherwise uninfluenced are very much unlikely to respond to
legal pressures.
The policy maker must decide how much to invest to change behavior
along a given margin at a given time. Peaks, valleys, and the shape of
behavior begin to matter a lot. Like Xeno's Paradox, improving the
behavioral model seems to get us closer to precise decision making but can
never quite get us to perfection. This is no criticism of either Professor
Jones or law and biology. The problem for the policymaker preceded the
advent of law and biology, and Professor Jones correctly argues that an
understanding of behavioral biology can improve legal decisions. He
states, "the approach.., can, at best, only describe the macroscopic
features of legal systems .... This does not trouble me.... [I]ncreasing
our understanding of the constraints on and patterns of macroscopic
superstructures of legal systems is more than sufficient to demonstrate
utility of evolutionary analysis in law."' 6 Given that legal decisions
typically must be made in any event, all improvements help.
The difficulty of using biology to predict the specifics of law prompts
Professor Jones to focus instead on non-law, which turns out to be much
16. Id. at 871-72.
[Vol. 53
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more important than we myopic lawyers typically recognize. Just as there
are so many more potential species and species' attributes than we actually
see in the world, there are many more potential laws than have existed
anywhere in the world. And there are clear and somewhat predictable
patterns regarding the general topics that law addresses, stemming from
the fact that what humans care about is in significant part determined by
our biology. By focusing on non-law, we are better able to understand law.
Wisdom and integrity underlie Professor Jones's approach: claim only
what you can clearly defend. Unfortunately, however, his conservatism
can leave the reader wondering, "so what?" As lawyers, we have little
concern for the law that will never arise. We care only about the laws that
either exist or could conceivably arise. And a macroscopic analysis, while
safe, does nothing to inform the all-important margin between law and
non-law. Law and biology will have to go further, as Professor Jones
acknowledges. But the next steps will be more difficult, and perhaps more
questionable. With the hope of stimulating that intellectual journey, I offer
two speculations about the behavioral sciences and what they may be able
to tell us about law.
First, I turn Professor Jones's claim about bio-legal history on its head.
Part III explores whether behavioral biology can help to glean something
useful about those existent laws that seem to contradict his predictions.
Second, to balance out the quite powerful notion that our brains are a
product of our evolution, I introduce brain plasticity in Part IV to suggest
that the physical structures of our brains change with the environments that
we create for them. The first speculation suggests that Professor Jones's
line of inquiry may tell us something about the desirability of particular
laws, and the second will, if correct, help the reader develop a more subtle
sense of the interaction between environment and evolution. Both of these
speculations, I believe, are fully consistent with the work of Professor
Jones and are therefore intended to complement his points.
III. PROPRIOCEPTION AND INTEREST GROUPS
Interest group theory, which lies at the intersection of economics and
political science, demonstrates that it is possible, even in representative
democracies, for laws to serve small subsets of the population at the
expense of the majority. Legislatures have a limited ability to pass laws
that benefit the public, and they have a limited amount of information
about the types of laws that are needed. Consequently, people who have
an interest in the enactment of particular laws have some incentive to
organize with similarly-inclined individuals to lobby their representatives
for change. These groups testify in the legislature, draft statutes, educate
legislators, staff members and journalists, raise funds, circulate petitions,
organize protests and rallies, contribute to political campaigns, and provide
HeinOnline  -- 53 Fla. L. Rev. 911 2001
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employment for retired legislators and their staff. Because some groups
organize more cheaply and effectively than others, interest group theory
predicts that the resulting laws will be skewed toward the more successful
groups. 7 Presumably these groups only lobby for the passage of those
laws that benefit their members, without regard to whether such laws
might be good for the rest of the society.
Two important points limit the negative implications of this cynical
view of government. First, many laws do end up furthering the public
interest. The typical voter-citizen may not be active in the political
process, but an organized interest group can often end up furthering his or
her interests as well. 8 Second, not all legislation proposed by powerful
interest groups is ultimately enacted. Two well-organized groups' interests
may be at odds with one another, giving the legislature an incentive to
avoid taking any action on the issue. 9 In addition, legislators typically
seek re-election, and political opponents can capitalize on an incumbent's
voting record if it includes support for laws that impose heavy costs on the
constituents. If government becomes too laden with interest-group deals,
the taxpayers revolt.2"
Public choice scholars debate the significance of these checks, although
they all agree there is some room for special interest laws. Because it is
often impossible to tell whether any particular legislation serves the public
interest or merely furthers some private interest, public choice theory has
practical limitations. The sponsors of successful private interest legislation
are unlikely to admit publicly that such legislation serves a private interest.
Instead, they make some claim about why the law is good for the public.
And public interest legislation often works its way through the legislative
process only because some private interest was willing to invest the
enormous amounts of energy required to ensure its enactment. If both
types of legislation further a private interest and claim a public interest,
17. Better ability to organize may be necessary but is not sufficient to obtain favorable laws.
More specifically, laws tend to benefit those groups that are able to (1) organize cheaply and
effectively, (2) prevent others from entering the group to usurp a share of the benefits, and (3)
minimize intra-group competition that threatens to dissipate the proceeds obtained. See generally
William R. Dougan & James M. Snyder, Are Rents Fully Dissipated?, 77 PUB. CHOICE 793 (1993)
(discussing conditions under which interest groups can obtain legislative benefits without fully
dissipating the potential rents in the lobbying process).
18. In fact, as you read this passage, you are likely free riding off of some group's efforts to
enact laws that will make your community a better place to live.
19. Cf Alan Schwartz&RobertE. Scott, The PoliticalEconomy ofPrivate Legislatures, 143
U. PA. L. REV. 595, 596-97 (1995) (suggesting that presence of opposing interest groups in private
lawmaking institutions tends to result in either inaction or promulgation of vague standards that
preserves the status quo ante).
20. See generally Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for
Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 395 (1983) (arguing that increased dead-weight costs
encourage taxpayer opposition to regulation).
[Vol. 53
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categorization ends up turning instead on the evaluating scholar's
normative judgment of the law.
Professor Jones's biolegal perspective might give us some
proprioceptive purchase on this public choice dilemma. To illustrate, let
us return to our recycling example. Some economists have questioned
whether recycling efforts are "efficient" because the efforts appear to
require significant time and energy and produce only a limited quantity of
recycled products."1 If people have a sufficiently strong taste for recycling,
however, the problem disappears for economists, because the benefits
from increasing individual utility offset the recycling costs. Simply
claiming a taste for recycling is too easy, however. Both the entrepreneur
who wishes to open a recycling facility and the city manager who hopes
to lower trash collection costs (in order to increase administrative salaries)
will assert that the people want recycling. Paper manufacturers and landfill
operators, on the other hand, promote their own interests, by claiming that
people do not wish to pay for recycling. The political scientist is left to
ponder whether the resulting recycling bill is anything more than special
interest legislation.
Behavioral biology can help us form an instinctive sense of individual
tastes in this area. If my genes are to survive and thrive, then my progeny
must have adequate resources. This reasoning might imply that humans are
instinctively conservationist. Conservation is costly, however, and might
therefore become important only when it begins to appear necessary to the
survival of the genes.22 And, in fact, the more crowded and resource
constrained our world has become, the greater the proportion of time that
people seem to spend worrying about conservation.
This reasoning can also be used to evaluate the different methods a
government might use to promote or discourage activities. For example,
the more closely a legal tool comports with our evolved psychologies, the
more powerfully it can combat behaviors that also were strongly adaptive
in the EEA. In the words of Amy Wax, sometimes "[i]t [takes a [g]ene to
[b]eat a [g]ene."23 Recycling is an admittedly poor example to use here,
but rape, domestic violence, and divorce are three areas that are already
benefiting from the work of Owen Jones and others.
Behavioral biology might ultimately tell us more, however. I submit
that amidst the "delicate, crenellated, lace-like filigree"24 of laws that are
not needless, pointless, useless, or toothless, there is Spanish moss. This
21. A discussion about the economics of recycling can be found at the website for the
Political Economy Research Center, located at http://www.perc.org/xaml.htm.
22. Matt Ridley makes a similar claim about ecology. MATr RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF
VIRTUE: HUMAN INSTINCTS AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 213-25 (1996).
23. Amy Wax, Against Nature-On Robert Wright's The Moral Animal, 63 U. CHI. L. REv.
307, 322 (1996) (book review).
24. Jones, supra note 8, at 854.
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Spanish moss jumps from branch to branch like an airborne virus. It is
vulnerable, no doubt, to removal, but it can and does exist. Spanish moss
is used by florists as a natural-looking camouflage for dirt. The legal
Spanish moss to which I refer is just as real and is also used as a cover.
The Spanish moss is none other than special interest legislation disguised
as public interest law.
Professor Jones's suggestion about biolegal history presupposes that
laws reflect the fact that our brains have evolved in a manner that limits
what we care about and what tools will affect our behavior. Scarcity and
its consequent competition together suggest that laws will be used to give
some an advantage relative to others. These laws may have neither the
purpose nor the effect that their proponents claimed, and they can exist for
a long time before they are weeded from the legal landscape.
Special interest legislation, in both its function and form, can be
consistent with what behavioral biology tells us about human tastes. In
fact, the more the accompanying political rhetoric makes "sense," at least
proprioceptive sense, to the citizens, the more likely the law will be
enacted. Although the rhetoric, to be effective, makes sense to our evolved
brains, we cannot tell whether these laws ultimately serve only the special
interests that lobbied for them or whether they end up benefiting the
general public as well.
Nevertheless, behavioral biology might be useful to help identify the
dirt beneath the Spanish moss. To succeed, behavioral biology must be
able to identify those laws that, despite their accompanying rhetoric, are
needless, pointless, useless, or toothless. Rather than affecting behavior in
some way that will advantage society, these laws serve only to provide an
advantage to one group at the expense of another. I think we already
instinctively evaluate rules in this manner. Consider, for example, building
codes that require that a particular kind of tile or brick be used in
construction. Why, we ask ourselves, would anyone care whether the
builder used this tile or some other type that is available on the commercial
market? If we cannot identify a reason that credibly comports with what
we know humans "legitimately" care about, then we begin to wonder
whether a particular tile or brick company might have some special
influence with those who produce the building codes.
In addition, a law that will not change behavior as claimed is likely to
be the product of special interest lobbying. We might better evaluate
whether the law will affect behavior as claimed if we view the activity
through an evolutionary lens. In short, a closer look at behavioral biology
might help us to better discriminate between public interest and special
interest legislation.
[Vol. 53
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IV. BRAIN PLASTICITY
Professor Jones's emphasis on brain evolution, coupled with a close
study of developments in neurophysiology, has the potential to help
policymakers better identify those behaviors that are most likely to be
influenced by society, education, and law.
As Professor Jones reminds us, our emotions, cognitive capacities, and
limitations are all a function of evolutionary forces at work on our brains.25
We cannot understand or predict human behavior without an
understanding of how human brains function as a result of evolution.
Important to this understanding is a recognition that natural selection is not
a forward-looking phenomenon. Those features that best serve present
environments tend to survive, but evolution takes time. A few hundred or
couple of thousand years is short, or "present," in light of the brain's much
longer evolutionary history. The dramatic and rapidly appearing changes
in our environment during the last couple of centuries have outpaced the
process of natural selection.
The fact that our brains evolved to deal with earlier times helps to
explain the seemingly "irrational" tendencies that have been showing up
in the experimental economics and psychology literature, as well as in our
every day life experiences. As Professor Jones points out in an important
article, our inability to commit ourselves to dieting, our tastes for spite,
and our tendency to cooperate "irrationally," all can be attributed to the
adaptiveness of these behaviors in the environments surrounding the time
period in which we evolved.26 Moreover, the fact that our brains evolved
to deal with context- and environment-specific problems helps explain
some common cognitive "failures," including an inability to deal with
abstract logical problems, probability assessments, other statistical
reasoning, and fine-tuned cost/benefit calculations. When presented with
the abstract, or with contexts that are not evolutionarily familiar, our brains
tend not to be as good at figuring things out.2
Although an understanding of behavioral biology can help us to explain
some peculiar cognitive and behavioral predispositions, it is important to
keep in mind that the human brain is extraordinarily plastic, and that brain
plasticity persists throughout our adult lives. No doubt certain cognitive
errors are commonplace, but some people do manage to avoid them, as
evidenced by the very fact that we are aware that these errors exist. Casual
25. Id. at 838.
26. See generally Jones, Time-ShiftedRationality, supra note 3. See also Richard A. Posner,
Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1561 (1998)
(proffering a biological explanation for generosity to strangers).
27. See generally LedaCosmides &John Tooby, Cognitive AdaptationsforSocialExchange,
in THE ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUrIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE 163,
181-206 (Jerome H. Barkow etal. eds., 1992) (discussing experimental data indicating that humans
perform better when problems are posed in some social context).
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observation indicates that economists rarely commit the sunk costs fallacy,
finance professors choose sound retirement plans, tax lawyers are
relatively good at calculating present values, logicians impressively solve
abstract logical problems, and statisticians are competent Bayesian
updaters. Of course, some of these talents are the product of self-selection.
Brains, on average, are predisposed in particular ways, but individual
brains do differ. We thus might expect those good at solving abstract
problems to gravitate toward analytical philosophy and those talented in
cost-benefit calculations to gravitate toward economics. In addition to
inherent individual variation, however, people do learn, and skills
improve, thanks to the functional plasticity of the brain.
Section A of this Part will briefly describe some recent studies of
human, primate and rodent brain plasticity. Section B will provide
important caveats for social efforts to capitalize on brain plasticity to
modify behavior. Finally, section C discusses some possible implications
of this brain research.
A. Evidence of Plasticity
The area of the brain called the neocortex has no sense of pain, so
neurosurgeons can operate on conscious patients whose skulls have been
numbed with local anesthesia.2" By stimulating points on the cortex,
observing the effects of the stimulation on the patients, and questioning the
patients about their experiences, surgeons were able to determine the
functions of the various areas of the cortex.29
In the somatosensory cortex, there are representations of the skin
surface of the entire body laid out as a somatotopic (think topographical)
map. This part of the cortex is responsible for processing touch sensations,
and the parts of the body are represented not in relation to their relative
size but in accordance with their importance in processing touch
sensations." The lips and the hand, for example, are allotted more
computational space on the surface map than is the back, and scientists
think this allotment is highly adaptive for the survival of the animal.3'
Studies in both adult primates and humans indicate that this cortical
mapping in the brain exhibits a significant degree of "functional
plasticity," or ability to remap in response to changed circumstances or
behavioral needs.32 I will describe here a few of the studies and their
28. MANFRED SPTZER, THE MIND WITHIN THENEr: MODELS OF LEARNiNG, THINKnNG, AND
ACTING 105 (1999).
29. Id. at 106.
30. Id.
31. Id
32. See, e.g., Avi Karni et al., Functional MRI Evidence for Adult Motor Cortex Plasticity
During Motor Skill Learning, NATURE, Sept. 14, 1995, at 155; Alvaro Pascual-Leone et al.,
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findings, and then explain why brain plasticity may be important to a
proprioceptive approach to law.
Michael Merzsenich and members of the Coleman laboratory at the
University of California, San Francisco, trained adult owl monkeys to
either rotate or press on a disc to receive a food pellet.33 The rotation of the
disc stimulated a limited sector of the skin on two to three fingers of these
monkeys.34 The experiment was designed to cause the monkeys to have
contact with the disc for approximately 1.5 hours each day for 3.5
months.3" The experimenters then looked for changes in the cortical
representations of the fingers in the brain.36 For those monkeys that had to
press on a flat disc, which took no concentration, there were no changes
in cortical representations over time.37 Monkeys required to rotate a disc
had to use the correct amount of pressure and rotate the disc in the correct
direction in order to receive a pellet.38 For this latter group, where more
attention was required to complete the task, significant changes showed up
in the cortical representations.39 The cortical representations of the
stimulated skin surfaces expanded to an area 1.76 to 2.71 times larger than
the representation area in the control mappings." In addition,
experimenters discovered that the receptive fields recorded were unusually
small.4 Representational discontinuities emerged, and the borders of the
hand representation expanded into the neighboring face representation.42
These changes in the monkeys' brains corresponded to an increased
ability to use their fingers and to discriminate stimuli to the fingers.43 A
similar change happens to human ballet dancers, who develop a much
more elaborate use of their feet than the rest of use who walk around flat-
footed and bundled in shoes. In the case of the owl monkeys, the expanded
Modulation of Cortical Motor Output Maps During Development of Implicit and Explicit
Knowledge, 263 Sci. 1287 (1994); G.H. Recanzone et al., Plasticity in the Frequency
Representation of Primary Auditory Cortex following Discrimination Training in Adult Owl
Monkeys, 13 J. NEUROSCiENCE 87 (1993); Ehud Ahissar et al., Dependence of Cortical Plasticity
on Correlated Activity of Single Neurons and on Behavioral Context, 257 Sci. 1412 (1992); H.
Aizawa, Reorganization of Activity in the Supplementary Motor Area Associated with Motor
Learningand Functional Recovery, 84 ExPERIMENTALBRAINREs. 668 (1991); William M. Jenkins
et al., Functional Reorganization of Primary Somatosensory Cortex in Adult Owl Monkeys after
Behaviorally Controlled Tactile Stimulation, 63 J. NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 82 (1990).
33. Jenkins et al., supra note 32, at 85.
34. Id. at 86.
35. Id. at 89.
36. Id. at 82.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 86.
39. Id. at 89.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 82.
42. Id. at 89.
43. Id. at 102.
917
HeinOnline  -- 53 Fla. L. Rev. 917 2001
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW
representational areas shrank when no longer used." Significant shrinking
was observed thirty-one days after the disc exercises ended, and further
shrinking was observed sixty-three days after the exercises ended.4"
The cortical plasticity finding has been replicated in various studies,
but I will mention only a few more here. Experimenters surgically fused
two of the fingers of owl monkeys, which resulted in behavioral
synchronicity of the fused digits.46 In a relatively short period of time, the
normally abrupt border between the two digits was eliminated in the
cortical mapping of these monkeys.47 In the mapping, the fingers were
represented in the same manner in which they were now being used, as
though they were a single digit.48
Moreover, when part of an arm is amputated, the surrounding cortical
representations of the body's surface are extensively remapped,
overlapping into the area previously occupied by the amputated part.49 In
fact, studies indicate that this remapping may explain what is known as the
"phantom limb" phenomenon.5" According to patient reports, amputees
often continue to feel, or sense, the hand, arm, breast, or leg that is no
longer there."
In a study at University of California, San Diego, humans who had lost
all or part of an arm were stimulated on the face and at the skin area of the
arm just above the amputation.5" These two areas of the skin border the
amputated portion of the arm in the cortical representation. 3 Some of the
subjects reported that they simultaneously "felt" the stimulation on both
the actual skin surface touched and some part of the missing limb.54 This
double sensation is likely attributable to the fact that the neighboring
cortical representations are overlapping the location where the amputated
arm had been previously represented. 55
The phantom limb reports may parallel more complex phenomena such
as grieving. Casual observation indicates that those who are grieving the
44. Id. at 91.
45. Id. at 93.
46. Id. at 82-83.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See generally V.S. Ramachandran, Plasticity inthe Adult Human Brain; Is There Reason
for Optimism?, in MATURATIONAL WINDOWS AND ADULT CORTICAL PLASTICITY 179 (B. Julesz
& I. Kovics eds., 1995).
50. For a discussion ofphantom limbs, successful treatment, and its implications for theories
of the brain, see V.S. Ramachandran et al., Illusions of Body Image: What They Reveal About
Human Nature, in THE MIND-BRAIN CONTINuM 29, 30-37 (Rodolfo Llinas & Patricia S.
Churchland eds., 1996).
51. See generally id.; Ramachandran, supra note 49.
52. Ramachandran, supra note 49, at 183-84.
53. Id. at 182.
54. Id. at 180-83.
55. Id. at 181.
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loss of a loved one continue to "function" for awhile as though the
individual is still alive. Intellectually, the griever can articulate that the
deceased is no longer alive, but the griever nevertheless finds himself
waiting for the telephone to ring or the door to open. The widow spends
a period of time leaving her husband's side of the bed vacant and
continues to make decisions that the absent spouse would have approved.
Is it possible that our relationships with those we love are somehow
mapped onto the brain so that severing those relationships becomes
temporarily difficult in part because of the time it takes to achieve a
remapping? In the end, we do not forget what that relationship "felt" like,
but we do learn to allow other things to take over its space. Can it be said
that grieving and healing is an example of functional plasticity?
Studies of cortical plasticity suggest that a certain amount of attention
is required to induce changes in brain mapping, at least with respect to
stimuli without the brain."6 Studies also indicate that significant
improvements in functional plasticity require a combination of "active"
behavior, coupled with thought, concentration, and reward or motivation
for behavior (which may induce the concentration).
For example, scientists in Israel used adult monkeys to study the firing
of neurons and the causes of improved synaptic plasticity. In their
experiment, one group of monkeys was given an auditory discrimination
task. 9 These monkeys were presented with differing sounds, and, if a
monkey responded to the correct one, it received a drop of juice.6' A
second group of monkeys received the same sequence of sounds but did
not perform the task or receive a reward.6 A third group received juice,
but randomly in response to a random sequence of sounds.62 The monkeys
in the first group, those who received conditioning associated behavior,
exhibited by far the strongest improvement in connection between the
firing of interacting neurons." In many cases, the monkeys exhibited no
neuronal plasticity at all without the combination of a pattern requiring
concentration plus a reward.64
Other studies of adult primates and humans not only have produced
results consistent with the study in Israel but also have shed further light
on how people learn. A lab in Japan trained adult monkeys to perform
simple key press movements in response to visual stimuli.65 If the monkeys
56. See, e.g., Kami et al., supra note 32, 155.
57. See, e.g., Ahissar et al., supra note 32, 1412.
58. Id.
59. Id.




64. Id. at 1414.
65. Aizawa, supra note 32, at 668.
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saw a right light illuminate, then they were to press the right button." If
they saw a left light illuminate, they were to press the left button.67 Each
monkey that pressed the correct button was rewarded.6" When the monkey
was trained for a relatively short period of time-up to four
months-scientists observed neuronal activity in the associated
supplementary motor area before the monkey moved its limb.69 However,
when the monkey was trained for twelve months, the premovement
activity in the supplemental motor area disappeared.70 The authors think
that the brain eliminates redundancy over time, because the same neuronal
activity occurs in the primary motor cortex.7 Once a task becomes
overleamed, they hypothesize, the brain reduces redundancy to enable
more efficient information transmittal and to make way for higher level,
more complex activities.' We can view the shift from the supplementary
motor area to the primary motor cortex as the equivalent of habit
formation, which works much like our morning drive to work on autopilot.
The same experimenters then lesioned the primary motor cortex of the
monkeys, allowed a three-week recovery period, and retrained the
monkeys on the key press.7' The premovement neuronal activity
reappeared in the supplementary motor area.74 These results again indicate
the highly plastic nature of the brain, which responds very much to both
behavior and to changes within the brain.
Another study of human adults indicates that the brain treats
information during a learning process differently from the way it treats
actually acquired knowledge.' The experiment involved sequential finger
movements.76 The subjects were placed in front of a computer with a
"mouse" that had four buttons.' Each finger was assigned to one of the
four buttons.7" When a number showed up on the screen, the subject was
asked to press the appropriate button with the appropriate finger.79 The
number remained on the screen until the subject successfully completed






71. Id. at 668, 670.
72. Id. at 671.
73. Id. at 669.
74. Id. at 670.
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This sequence occurred 120 times, then the subject took a break, then the
subject received 120 more numbers, followed by a break, and so on.8
The subjects were broken into two groups.8 2 The control group was
given a random sequence of numbers.83 The test group was given a
sequence of twelve numbers repeated ten times (i.e., 124432123341). At
the end of each batch of 120 trials, each subject was asked whether he
thought the order of numbers was random or patterned.85 If a subject
thought that the numbers were patterned, then he was asked to articulate
the pattern. 6 The study compared the development of "implicit" and
"explicit" knowledge. 7 Implicit knowledge involves the correct awareness
that there is a pattern but an inability to construct that pattern.88 Explicit
knowledge requires that the subject be able to articulate the pattern. 9
While the tasks were performed, experimenters mapped the cortical motor
outputs to the muscles involved in the task.90
Performance during the first block of 120 numbers was the same for
both groups.9 Across blocks, the control group response times remained
stable, and there was no change in the mapping of cortical outputs to any
of the muscles for this group, so long as the practice sessions lasted for
less than two hours each day.92 In contrast, the test group had progressively
shorter response times and exhibited progressively larger maps of the
cortical outputs to the muscles involved in the task.93 After four batches,
the subjects' mean response time was approximately one-third of that of
the original batch, and there were significant increases in the mapped areas
as well as an increased amplitude of neuronal activity.94 At this point, all
test subjects had figured out that they had been given a non-random
pattern, but no one could yet articulate that pattern.95 In other words, the
test subjects had acquired implicit knowledge. 6
The cortical output maps to the muscles involved in the task became







87. Id. at 1288.
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occurred in six to nine batches, depending on the subject.97 After explicit
knowledge was achieved, the output maps returned to their baseline
topography, but response times continued to fall down to one-sixth of the
original time.9" At this point, the subjects were no longer reacting to the
number signal but were instead anticipating it.99 To the authors, the results
suggest that as a motor sequence is explicitly learned, the contribution of
the motor cortex is attenuated and other brain structures assume a more
active role in the execution of the task as a skill becomes overlearned or
automatic."° If so, the study provides further evidence that the brain
functions in a plastic and relatively efficient manner.
Neurophysiologists have also confirmed that functional plasticity, at
least as it relates to cortical representations, continues into old age. °1 A
study of rats and aging found significant physical changes in the brain that
correspond to the changing use of the rats' legs as they age. 0 2 Young rats
walk only on the pads of their feet, while the hind part of the leg of old rats
falls and dragging in their steps is common. 3 When the somatosensory
hindpaw representations of the two groups were compared, scientists
observed enlarged receptor fields for the old rats covering multiple areas,
which corresponds to the increased leg use and dragging.0" Moreover, fine
distinctions and gradations in these representations had broken down,
which corresponds to the decreased functionality of the foot pads. 5 The
cortical topographies overlapped and became jumbled as a result of the
overlapping representations." These brain differences were not a function
of age alone.0 7 Old rats that walked like younger rats did not exhibit these
representational changes in the brain. 8 The brain changes appear to be a
response to differing behavioral stimuli, and they appear to occur even at




100. Id. at 1288.
101. See M.M. Merzenich & R.C. deCharms, Neural Representations, Experience, and
Change, in THE MIND-BRAIN CONTINUUM 61, 62 (Rodolfo Llinas & Patricia S. Churchland eds.,
1996) (concluding that "lilt is now clear that the brain is malleable throughout life").
102. F. Spengler et al., Effects of Aging on Topographic Organization of Somatosensory
Cortex, 6 NEmRo REP. 469, 469-70 (1995).
103. Id.
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B. Behavior Modification and Caveats
This plasticity is fascinating, and the research may someday prove
promising for our attempts to encourage and teach law-abiding,
cooperative behaviors. After all, if environments can change the physical
structure of the brain, both predictably and efficiently, then presumably
environments can affect both our thinking and behavior in important ways.
Moreover, if plasticity continues through adulthood, then perhaps socially
relevant behaviors are also always subject to some change at the margins.
Competition within the brain for space depends on behavior, practice and
motivation, which means that there is a cost to changing our patterns of
thought and action. Moreover, the phantom limb studies reinforce our
instinctual belief that old habits die hard. But, these studies also indicate
that habits can be replaced functionally, even if they are never forgotten.
There are several potential problems, however, with the idea that we
can manipulate environments to change the physical structure of the brain
(even assuming that structural changes ultimately contribute to behavioral
changes). First, we need to know more about critical periods."0 Although
our knowledge of the brain is growing at an astounding rate, we are still
ignorant about much of higher level learning. For some brain development,
critical periods allow only a limited window for plasticity.' Some
abilities and skills, including eyesight and language development, are
triggered only or primarily in children." 2 Moreover, neuronal degradation
110. As Gilbert Gottlieb has explained,
There are prenatal and postnatal periods or stages in development when the
organism is dependent on certain forms of stimulation for subsequent normal
(typical) development. Other ways of viewing these stages are that they are ones
in which the organism is maximally susceptible to certain kinds of stimulation, or
when ease of mastering certain behavioral traits is much higher than at other times
in the life cycle. These stages are sometimes referred to as critical periods of
development.... On its weakest interpretation, the concept of an optimum or
critical stage implies that the development of particular abilities or endpoints is
not equipotential over the lifespan; on its strongest interpretation, the critical
period concept means that certain experiences must occur during a delimited
period early in development if subsequent development is to be normal (species
typical).
Gilbert Gottlieb, The Psychobiological Approach to Developmental Issues, in INFANCY AND
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOBIOLOGY 6, 7 (1983) (Marshall M. Haith & Joseph J. Campos eds.,
1983).
Ill. Id.
112. Paula Tallal etal., Language Comprehension in Language-Learning lmpaired Children
Improved with Acoustically Modified Speech, 271 Sci. 81, 83 (1996).
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in the elderly affects memory and other performance-related skills in ways
that may limit our ability to influence them.' 3
Second, some learning is permanent, but some is only temporary, and
some brain changes occur only under behavioral stimuli. Even temporary
changes require both behavior and a motivation to attend to that
behavior."4 Although potentially limiting as a social tool, these advances
in brain science confirm the belief of many that the important lessons in
life require the active involvement of the subject. After unsuccessfully
preaching to teenage girls about the costs of young motherhood, some
teachers created the experience for the girls."5 Teachers handed each
student a bundle that she could not drop or leave alone for a few days.
During this period, the girls found their bundles making loud noises in the
middle of the night, during their television programs, and in the midst of
their socializing with friends." 6 The girls turned their bundles back
reporting a new appreciation for the importance of responsible sexual
behavior. "' Perhaps these insights can tell us more about the effectiveness
of community service and alternative ways to present driver education
materials." 8
113. See Spengler et al., supra note 102, at 469.
114. See Merzenich & deCharms, supra note 101, at 71 ("Cortical plasticity is induced by
learning, but not when equivalent stimuli are delivered to a nonattending animal, or when there is
not an appropriate source of cognitive drive (reward, punishment, novelty, etc.) in the behavior.").
115. See, e.g., Jane J. Russel, Editorial, And, Baby, Did She Think This Over, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, May 17, 2001, at 7B (describing a weekend assignment for school health class);
Tammy L. Carter, Baby Was a Boomer-And a Lesson, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 17, 2001, at El
(describing a project of an eighth grade science teacher); Karen Klinka, Bringing Up "Baby":
Students Find Caringfor Baby a Challenge, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, May 14, 2001, at I (describing
a Catholic high school assignment); Lynn Seeden, Baby, Think It Over, ORANGE COUNTY
REGISTER, June 7, 2001, at I (describing a high school student project); Rosa Salter, Sacks ofFlour
Made Couple Come Up With a Better Baby, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, June 24,2001, at H2
(reporting that over I million teens have used the baby simulators). One study attempted to track
the effectiveness of the baby simulator programs. Charyl L. Somers & Mariane M. Fahlman,
Effectiveness of the "Baby Think it Over" Teen Pregnancy Prevention Program, J. SCH. HEALTH,
May 1,2001, at 188. Seventy-nine percent of the teenagers polled said that the baby simulator made
them more concerned about becoming pregnant. When students given the baby simulators were
compared to a control population, however, the students with the simulators did not experience a
statistically significant reduction in teen pregnancy. The study cites methodological flaws as
possible explanations. Interestingly, the authors thought that one weekend might have been too
short a period of time for the program to have a lasting effect. Id. at 192.
116. See generally sources cited supra note 115.
117. See generally sources cited supra note 115.
118. It is also important to reach teenagers early. Plasticity exists in most aspects of brain
development at least through puberty, which means that the environment of young people matters
significantly. Julia A. Graber & Anne C. Petersen, Cognitive Changes at Adolescence: Biological
Perspectives, in BRAIN MATURATION AND COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT: COMPARATIVE AND CRoss-
CULTURAL PER SPECTIVEs 253, 274 (Kathleen R. Gibson & Anne C. Peterson eds., 1991). And,
although brain plasticity does exist throughout adulthood, the effects of environment on the brain
may become less marked as time passes. Advances in knowledge about brain maturation eventually
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A third difficulty with attempting to promote specific social behavior
is the fact that some cognitive and motor improvements are highly specific
to the task trained and have not proven to be generalizable to other
contexts. Consider, for example, one study that involved training in a
finger-tapping sequence." 9 Subjects practiced their tapping for ten to
twenty minutes each day for three weeks, and by the end, they had more
than doubled their initial rate of completion and their accuracy improved
significantly.' These skill improvements lasted for several months with
no additional training.' The training resulted in both improved synaptic
connections and enlarged cortical representations. 2 Unfortunately for our
purposes, these improvements were confined to the specific hand trained
and did not carry over to the other hand." Moreover, the learning did not
generalize to new sequences, even though the new sequences were made
up of identical component movements. 2 4
Fourth, some efforts to teach social behaviors can be limited by the
potential for deafferentiation. Deafferentiation occurs when subjects repeat
tasks with stereotypy, or little variety. In these circumstances, the
individual attends to his behavior, but the lack of variety in that behavior
leads to performance inabilities over time. Musicians, for example, can
suddenly find themselves unable to move their hands in the manner
necessary to play their instruments well. The neurophysiology of
deafferentiation appears similar to the cortical representation changes for
older rats. In both circumstances, the relevant cortical representations
expand, but instead of the finer gradations and clear borders between
sensory areas that are seen with the honing of a motor skill, these
representations become essentially undifferentiated. Deafferentiation can
lead to focal dystonia, or an inability to move parts of the body (i.e.,
fingers) separately. Thus, the regimentation, or overlearning of certain
behaviors, can cause a degradation in the feedback information, which can
ultimately lead to an inability to fine-tune the behavior in question.
Perhaps there is some parallel here to moral teachings that take the form
of stylized, repetitive chanting.
Finally, and most importantly, any efforts to change social behaviors
must confront the fundamental lessons contained in the work of Professor
Jones. Our brains are the result of evolutionary forces, and some of those
forces are more powerful than others. We can train people to make better
cost-benefit analyses and we can teach them to solve abstract logical
may help us to draw the lines between the juvenile and adult justice systems more precisely.
119. Kami et al., supra note 32, at 155.
120. Id. at 155-56.
121. Id. at 155.
122. Id. at 158.
123. Id. at 156.
124. Id.
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problems. But we may not be able to teach them selflessness, non-
jealousy, or non-materialism. Furthermore, these changes are inevitably
costly, and the price may be too high in some cases but not in others.
Those trained in economics always look for trade-offs, and the same must
be true for behavioral biology. My goal here is simply to point out that
plasticity and evolution counterweigh each other, and neither should be
ignored when fashioning legal decisions. I am confident that Professor
Jones agrees.
C. Legal Implications
How much can neuroscience tell us about the law and its role in
influencing human behavior? The scientific research remains focused on
very basic forms of behavior, and much of that research involves other
species. Because research on brain plasticity is still in its very early stages,
and humans are wonderfully complex creatures, any suggestions about the
relationship between the science and the law will seem wildly speculative.
Nevertheless, if the connection is plausible, then it is worthwhile to follow
future developments in neuroscience because that knowledge might edify
our efforts to use the law as productively as possible. My goal here is to
convince the reader that there are plausible, if speculative, connections
between brain plasticity research and the law. Moreover, I intend what
follows to be illustrative rather than exhaustive of possible connections.
That said, a focus on the tradeoffs between evolutionary biology and
brain plasticity might help us to understand how law is, and perhaps
should be, designed. Consider, for example, the distinction between
criminal and civil negligence in our legal system. One of the purposes of
our civil negligence system is to encourage people to take care to avoid
harming others, but we also want to encourage people to take the optimal
amount of care, which requires them to think about the costs of harm and
of safety efforts. If in fact we use the civil negligence system to encourage
people to make more precise calculations of expected costs and benefits,
then a better understanding of brain plasticity and its limitations aids our
determination of the proper negligence standard for criminal law. If
culpability is essential to criminal convictions, then we must be careful not
to condemn those who had difficulty making a cognitive calculation that
is generally difficult for humans. The civil law encourages people to
practice thinking about these calculations, but if everyday life provides
insufficient practice to increase significantly our skills, then we might
reserve criminal negligence only for people whose miscalculation
represent a gross deviation from the standard of care we impose in our
civil system.'25 If, however, professionals and experts engage in potentially
125. See generally Jeffrey S. Parker, The Economics ofMens Rea, 79 VA. L. REV. 741 (1993)
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harmful behavior on a repeat basis, then we might expect them to be better
at calculating the costs and benefits of their activities than would a lay
person. Criminal negligence may therefore be more appropriate for
professionals than for lay individuals.
Judges and juries should also find some claimed eye-witness testimony
more credible than others. External stimuli must compete for attention by
the brain, and the brain has evolved to pay attention first to new facts that
are important to the well-being of the individual. We are most likely to
notice whether a visitor has a gun in his hand or whether a woman had an
appealing physique. We are less likely to notice the color of a person's
eyes or the page number in the book we are reading. And similar reasoning
must be true for mistakes of fact. Lessons from brain plasticity remind us,
however, that experts are better able to capture some information than
others. An accountant, for example, is more likely to find a reporting error
than is the lay individual, so that the lay person's "mistake" may be more
credible than the accountant's.
The limited mistake of law defense to criminal law may also make
sense in light of what we now know about the brain. In the past few
decades we have witnessed a proliferation of complex regulatory statutes
that are often strengthened with criminal sanctions. When those complex
statutes touch our lives, the information burden on the average person is
probably more than we can reasonably be expected to bear. The mistake
of law defense has been used in these circumstances to either excuse those
of us who did not know our legal obligations or to require the government
to subsidize our costs of obtaining information about the law.126
Interestingly, the mistake of law defense, in effect, is narrowly cabined to
disallow repeat players from using the defense."2 7 These individuals have
enough contact with the regulation to be easily trainable with regard to
their intricacies.12 '
Somewhat relatedly, we know enough about the brains of the elderly
now to acknowledge that simple regulations and choices are probably
better than more complex ones.'29 For example, a nuanced health care
program better enables an elderly individual to choose those features that
best suit her needs. Unfortunately, however, nuanced health care systems
(discussing mens rea and the efficiency implications of placing information burdens on criminal
defendants).
126. For a discussion of cases requiring the government to provide information to potential
defendants, see Richard S. Murphy & Erin A. O'Hara, Mistake ofFederal Criminal Law: A Study
of Coalitions and Costly Information, 5 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 217, 265-70 (1997).
127. See id. at 260-61 (discussing how enforcement efforts and appellate review standards
work together to filter defendants in criminal tax prosecutions).
128. See id. at 256-57 (explaining that no mistake of law defense is available for industry
regulations).
129. For a discussion of the biology ofaging and its legal implications, see generally RICHARD
A. POsNER, AGING AND OLD AGE (1995) and sources cited therein.
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can be quite complex, and those complexities can make it difficult for the
elderly to understand fully the choices that they are making. The latter
concern turns out to be more problematic than we had previously thought,
given that fine-tuned distinctions appear to be among the first victims of
neuronal degradation. Of course, the program fit must be weighed against
the difficulties of processing complexities, but the proper balance likely
entails more simplicity than it would for younger adult decision makers.
The tension between evolutionary forces and plasticity in the brain is
also relevant to the debate between economists and criminal lawyers
regarding the effectiveness of deterrence. Some criminal lawyers contend
that deterrence does not work. Criminals continue to commit crimes no
matter what the penalty while non-criminals refrain from criminal
behavior even when no one is observing them. In contrast, some
economists contend that if you raise the price of criminal activity, it must
be that less of it is demanded by potential offenders. Despite empirical
efforts by members on both sides of this debate to prove the correctness of
their views, " a nuanced interpretation of the facts seems to indicate that
some but not all crimes are significantly affected by marginal deterrence
efforts. More specifically, violent crimes seem to be less responsive to
small changes in punishment or the probability of conviction than are non-
violent crimes.
From the perspectives of behavioral biology and neurophysiology, this
result makes sense. Human emotions are a result of evolutionary forces,
and violent behaviors tend to be those that are most closely aligned with
these forces. On the other hand, repeat behaviors are subject to more
careful cost-benefit calculations. White collar crimes and black market
activities make up a significant portion of non-violent crimes, and these
individuals are likely relatively good at calculating the costs and benefits
of their criminal activities and acting accordingly. If so, then at the margin
this group of potential crimes is more likely to respond to law enforcement
efforts.
Interestingly, as a society we may want potential offenders to make
more precise cost-benefit calculations in some situations but less precise
calculations in others. We might wish to send the message that it does not
pay to speed in a work zone while at the same time asserting that other
behaviors are just plain wrong. We teach children from a very young age
130. E.g., compare Daniel Kessler & Steven D. Levitt, Using Sentencing Enhancement to
Distinguish Between Deterrence andIncapacitation, 42 J.L. &ECON. 343,359 (1999) (arguing that
sentencing enhancement increased deterrence) and Raymond A. Atkins & Paul H. Rubin, Effects
of Criminal Procedure on Crime Rates: Mapping Out the Consequences ofthe Exclusionary Rule,
(Oct. 23, 1998), available at http:llwww.ssrn.com/sol3/papers:cfn? abstract id=140992 (arguing
that an increase in crime has followed the adoption of the exclusionary rule), with MICHAEL TONRY,
SENTENCING MATTERS 137 (1996) (suggesting that government officials are concluding increased
penalties do not reduce crime).
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that all drugs are bad and likely to kill them. And the ten commandments
are repeated over and over in Sunday school. It may be that some crimes
are more easily averted by getting people to focus on cost-benefit
calculations while others are more easily averted by taking advantage of
cognitive weaknesses. If we overlearn the golden rule, propaganda, and
social memes, then we might just affect a type of deafferentiation within
the brain. People are unable to make fine-tuned distinctions about right and
wrong, but with deafferentiation we are better able to eradicate the wrong.
In contrast, overdeterrence becomes a potential problem for malum
prohibitum crimes. These criminal statutes prohibit behavior that is not
inherently wrongful, so conduct close to the line of criminality may be
socially useful and worthy of protecting. Tax deductions are an example.
Certain deductions are impermissible, whereas others are not only
permitted, they are encouraged. In these contexts, society might well want
people to make fine-tuned distinctions between permitted and prohibited
acts. We might therefore expect that effective law enforcement propaganda
will encourage taxpayers to weigh carefully the costs and benefits of their
activities.
V. CONCLUSION
Owen Jones's excellent Dunwody Lecture is rich, original and thought-
provoking. I have no noteworthy suggestions for its improvement. Instead,
this response offers two admittedly speculative suggestions for future
research topics in biolegal history and for law and the behavioral sciences
generally.
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